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Abstract
We characterize the complete set of protocols that may be used to securely encrypt n
quantum bits using secret and random classical bits. In addition to the application of such
quantum encryption protocols to quantum data security, our framework allows for generaliza-
tions of many classical cryptographic protocols to quantum data. We show that the encrypted
state gives no information without the secret classical data, and that 2n random classical bits
are the minimum necessary for informationally secure quantum encryption. Moreover, the
quantum operations are shown to have a surprising structure in a canonical inner product
space. This quantum encryption protocol is a generalization of the classical one time pad
concept. A connection is made between quantum encryption and quantum teleportation[1],
and this allows for a new proof of optimality of teleportation.
1 Introduction
We consider informationally secure encryption protocols, where any potential eavesdropper, Eve,
will have no information about the original quantum state, even if she manages to steal or intercept
the entire encrypted quantum data. This scenario is very different from the well-known scheme
of quantum cryptography, which in the usual sense[2, 3] is really a secure expansion of an existing
classical key, using a quantum channel and a pre-selected set of quantum states. The resulting
secure bits might then be used for an encryption algorithm on classical data. But suppose one is
concerned with securing quantum data, as is the case considered in this paper. Extending ideas
from QKD (such as testing bits in conjugate bases), one might show that given the test is passed,
the quantum bits are also secure. However, this case is ill-suited to data security as opposed to
communication security. For the tasks targeted in the paper, we need a method to make sure that
even if the eavesdropper takes the quantum data, she will still learn nothing about the quantum
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information. In this case, the eavesdropper may not care about passing any tests, and may remove
the qubits and replace them with junk.
We provide a simple method to get informationally secure encryption of any quantum state
using a classical secret key. This could have several interesting applications. For example, if we
imagine a scenario where good quantum memories are expensive, one might rent quantum storage.
Security in such a public-storage model would be a high priority. We assume the user cannot store
quantum data herself, but can store classical data. Methods of using trusted centers for quantum
cryptography have been developed[4]. Our method would allow a user to encrypt her quantum
data using a classical key and allow a potentially malicious center to store the data, and yet she
would know that the center could learn nothing about her stored quantum data. Additionally,
the untrusted center could act as a quantum communication provider. Several other applications
which involve adaptations of classical cryptographic protocols, such as quantum secret sharing
using classical key, are outlined later in the paper.
2 Classical Informationally Secure Encryption
If M is the random variable for the message, and C is the random variable for the ciphertext (i.e.,
output of the encryption process), then Shannon defined informationally secure cryptography in
the following way[5]:
I(M ;C) = H(C)−H(C|M) = 0 . (1)
The above relationship implies p(c|m) = p(c), i.e., that the ciphertext, c, is independent of the
message, m. Since one must be able to recover the message from the ciphertext given the key,
one must also satisfy I(M ;C|K) = H(M). Hence, the secrecy condition combined with the
recoverability condition imply that H(K) ≥ H(M) and H(C) ≥ H(M) for informationally secure
cryptography.
An example of informationally secure cryptography is the one time pad[6]. The message m is
compressed to it’s entropy, and then a full-entropy random string of length H(M) is chosen and
called k. Then, the ciphertext is c = m⊕ k. Given c, one knows nothing of m, but given c and
k, one has m exactly.
This same one time pad approach may be applied in the quantum case.
3 Encryption of Quantum Data
Alice has a quantum state that she intends either to send to Bob, or to store in a quantum memory
for later use. Eve may intercept the state during transmission or may access the quantum memory.
Alice wants to make sure that even if Eve receives the entire state, she learns nothing. Toward
this end, any encryption algorithm must be a unitary operation, or more specifically a set of
unitary operations which may be chosen with some distribution. It must be unitary because one
must be able to undo the encryption, and any quantum operation that is reversible is unitary[7].
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The most general scheme is to have a set of M operations, {Uk}, k = 1, . . . ,M , where each
element Uk is a 2
n× 2n unitary matrix. This set of unitary operations is assumed to be known to
all, but the classical key, k, which specifies the Uk that is applied to the n-bit quantum state, is
secret. The key is chosen with some probability pk and the input quantum state is encrypted by
applying the corresponding unitary operation Uk. In the decryption stage, U
†
k is applied to the
quantum state to retrieve the original state.
The input state, ρ, is called the message state, and the output state, ρc, is called the cipher-
state. The protocol is secure if for every input state, ρ, the output state, ρc, is the totally mixed
state:
ρc =
∑
k
p(k)UkρU
†
k =
1
2n
I . (2)
The reason that ρc must be the totally mixed state is two fold. First, for security all inputs must
be mapped to the same output density matrix (because ρc must be independent of the input).
Second, the output must be the totally mixed state because the totally mixed state is clearly
mapped to itself by all encryption sets.
To see that this is secure, we note that Eve could prepare an n-bit totally mixed state on her
own. Since two processes that output the same density matrices are indistinguishable[8], anything
that can be learned from ρc can also be learned from the totally mixed state.
The design criterion is to find such a distribution of unitary operations {pk, Uk} that will map
all inputs to the totally mixed state. A construction of such a map is given next.
4 A Quantum One Time Pad
The algorithm is simple: for each qubit, Alice and Bob share two random secret bits. We assume
these bits are shared in advance. If the first bit is 0 she does nothing, else she applies σz to the
qubit. If the second bit is 0 she does nothing, else she applies σx. Now she sends the qubit to
Bob. She continues this protocol for the rest of the bits.
We now show that this quantum one time pad protocol is secure. First note that this bit-
wise protocol can be expressed in terms of our general quantum encryption setup by choosing
pk = 1/2
2n and Uk = X
αZβ (α, β ∈ {0, 1}n), where Xα =
n⊗
i=1
σα(i)x and Z
β =
n⊗
i=1
σβ(i)z . Thus X
α
corresponds to applying σx to the bits in positions given by the n-bit string α, and similarly for
Zβ. Next, define the inner product of two matrices, M1 and M2, as Tr(M1M
†
2). If the set of all
2n × 2n matrices is seen as an inner product space (with respect to the preceding inner product),
then one can easily verify that the set of 22n unitary matrices {XαZβ} forms an orthonormal
basis. Expanding any message state, ρ, in this XαZβ basis gives:
ρ =
∑
α,β
aα,βX
αZβ , (3)
where aα,β = Tr(ρZ
βXα)/2n. Using this formalism, it is clear that the given choice of pk and Uk
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satisfies eqn. (2), and hence the underlying protocol is secure:
∑
k
p(k)UkρU
†
k =
1
22n
∑
γ,δ
XγZδρZδXγ
=
1
22n
∑
α,β
aα,β
∑
γ,δ
XγZδXαZβZδXγ
=
1
22n
∑
α,β
aα,β
∑
γ,δ
(−1)α·δ⊕γ·βXαZβ
=
∑
α,β
aα,βδα,0δβ,0X
αZβ
= a0,0I =
Tr(ρ)
2n
I =
1
2n
I (4)
5 An Equivalent Problem
Since there are a continuum of valid density matrices, the quantum security criterion (2) can be
unwieldy to deal with. Here we introduce a modified condition that is necessary and sufficient for
security.
Lemma 5.1 An encryption set {pk, Uk} satisfies eqn. (2) if and only if it satisfies:
M∑
k=1
p(k)UkX
αZβU †k = δα,0δβ,0I . (5)
Proof: To show that the above condition is sufficient, express ρ in the XαZβ basis, as was
done in eqn. (4) and apply the eqn. (5).
M∑
k=1
p(k)UkρU
†
k =
M∑
k=1
p(k)Uk

∑
α,β
aα,βX
αZβ

U †k
=
∑
α,β
aα,β
M∑
k=1
p(k)UkX
αZβU †k
=
∑
α,β
aα,βδα,0δβ,0I
= a0,0I =
Tr(ρ)
2n
I =
1
2n
I
To show that the modified condition eqn. (5), is necessary is somewhat more involved. First
let us introduce some new notations:
ρi =
I + σi
2
and ρmix =
I
2
.
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The proof may be obtained by induction. Suppose all Xα with |α| ≤ k are mapped to zero by
the encryption process. Now consider the following product state of n− k− 1 mixed states, with
exactly k + 1 pure states ρx:
ρ = ρmix ⊗ ρmix ⊗ . . . ⊗ ρmix ⊗ ρx ⊗ ρx ⊗ . . .⊗ ρx
By expanding the above becomes:
ρ =
I
2n
+
1
2n
2k−1∑
α=1
Xα +
1
2n
X2
k+1−1
In the above we use decimal numbers where before we defined Xα with α in binary; hence
X3 = X00...011. When the above ρ is encrypted we know that I2n is mapped to itself. By
assumption Xα with |α| ≤ k is mapped to zero, hence the sum in the expansion of ρ disappears.
Since ρ must be mapped to I2n , then the last term in the above, which is X
α with |α| = k + 1,
must be mapped to zero. By permuting the initial input states, all Xα with |α| = k + 1 must be
mapped to zero. The case where k = 1 is our base case. By induction all Xα are mapped to zero.
If x is replaced by z in the above, then all Zβ are mapped to zero also. If x is replaced by y
and using the fact that all Xα and Zβ are mapped to zero, one sees that all XαZβ are mapped
to zero, which proves the lemma.
Thus, by using a basis for the set of 2n × 2n matrices, the condition for security becomes
discrete, and only 22n equations need to be satisfied by the set {pk, Uk}. The above lemma will
be useful for showing necessary conditions on encryption sets.
6 Characterization and Optimality of Quantum One-Time Pads
So far, we have provided one quantum encryption protocol based on bit-wise Pauli rotations,
which uses 2n random classical bits in order to encrypt n quantum bits. In this section we
explore the following questions: (1) What are some of the other choices of {pk, Uk} that can be
used to perform quantum encryption? In general, can one precisely characterize all possible valid
choices of {pk, Uk}? and (2) Is the simple quantum one time pad protocol optimal? That is, can
one encrypt n-bit quantum states using less than 2n random secret classical bits? First, we prove
a sufficient condition for choosing a secure encryption protocol, and then provide a corresponding
necessary condition as well. In particular, we show that one cannot perform secure encryption of
n-bit quantum states using less than 2n random classical bits.
Lemma 6.1 Any unitary orthonormal basis for the 2n × 2n matrices uniformly applied encrypts
n quantum bits.
Proof: We can always write the matrices, Uk, in terms of the X
αZβ basis as
Uk =
∑
α,β
Ckα,βX
αZβ . (6)
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Since these Uk’s form an orthonormal basis, the 2
2n × 22n transformation matrix C, comprising
of the transformation coefficients, is a unitary matrix. Hence, the rows and columns of C are
orthonormal:
M∑
k=1
Ckα,β(C
k
γ,δ)
∗ = δα,γδβ,δ and
∑
α,β
Ckα,β(C
l
α,β)
∗ = δk,l . (7)
By substitution of Uk in (2) the lemma is obtained:
1
22n
∑
k
UkρU
†
k =
1
22n
∑
k

∑
α,β
Ckα,βX
αZβ

 ρ

∑
γ,δ
Ckγ,δ
∗
ZδXγ


=
1
22n
∑
k
∑
α,β
∑
γ,δ
Ckα,βC
k
γ,δ
∗
XαZβρZδXγ
=
1
22n
∑
α,β
∑
γ,δ
(∑
k
Ckα,βC
k
γ,δ
∗
)
XαZβρZδXγ
=
1
22n
∑
α,β
∑
γ,δ
δα,γδβ,δX
αZβρZδXγ
=
1
22n
∑
α,β
XαZβρZβXα
=
1
2n
I
Lemma 6.2 Given any quantum encryption set, {pk, Uk}, k = 1, · · · ,M , (i.e.,
∑
k
pk = 1, Uk is
unitary, and eqns. (2) and (5) are satisfied), let U˜k =
√
pkUk =
∑
α,β
C˜kα,βX
αZβ, and let C˜ be
the M × 22n transformation matrix, comprising of the transformation coefficients C˜kα,β . Then
M ≥ 22n, and
C˜†C˜ =
1
22n
I22n×22n .
Proof: {pk, Uk} satisfies eqns. (2) and (5). Hence, for every ℓ,m ∈ {0, 1}n,
δℓ,0δm,0I =
M∑
k=1
p(k)UkX
ℓZmU †k
=
M∑
k=1
U˜kX
ℓZmU˜k
†
=
M∑
k=1
∑
α,β
∑
γ,δ
C˜kα,β(C˜
k
γ,δ)
∗XαZβXℓZmZδXγ
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=
∑
α,β
∑
γ,δ
(−1)β·ℓ+γ·(β+δ+m)
(
M∑
k=1
C˜kα,β(C˜
k
γ,δ)
∗
)
Xα+γ+ℓZβ+δ+m
=
∑
p,q

∑
α,β
(−1)β·ℓ+(p+ℓ+α)·q
(
M∑
k=1
C˜kα,β(C˜
k
α+p+ℓ,β+q+m)
∗
)XpZq.
Using the linear independence of the XpZq, only the identity component is non-zero. Hence
security implies:
δℓ,0δm,0δp,0δq,0 =
∑
α,β
(−1)β·ℓ+α·q
(
M∑
k=1
C˜kα,β(C˜
k
α+p+ℓ,β+q+m)
∗
)
=
∑
α,β,γ,δ
(−1)β·ℓ+α·qδγ,α+p+ℓδδ,β+q+m
(
M∑
k=1
C˜kα,β(C˜
k
γ,δ)
∗
)
(8)
As it will be evident, the second step in the above equation will be used to introduce a linear
algebra formulation of the problem. Now, let
Ψ(α,β),(γ,δ) =
M∑
k=1
C˜kα,β(C˜
k
γ,δ)
∗ ,
which is the standard inner product of the (α, β)th and the (γ, δ)th columns of C˜ or
(
C˜†C˜
)
(α,β),(γ,δ)
,
and let
M(ℓ,m,p,q),(α,β,γ,δ) = (−1)β·ℓ+α·qδγ,α+p+ℓδδ,β+q+m .
Eqn. (8) can now be written as a set of 24n linear equations: MΨ = [1 0 · · · 0 ]T , where Ψ is
the 24n × 1 vector consisting of all the possible inner products of pairs of columns of C˜, and M
is a 24n × 24n matrix with elements from the set 1, 0,−1. Next we observe that a matrix A is
orthogonal if and only if
∑
j Ai,jAi′,j = A
2
i δi,i′ , where Ai is the norm of the i
th row (which must
be greater than zero). One can easily verify that M is an orthogonal matrix:
∑
α,β,γ,δ
M(ℓ,m,p,q),(α,β,γ,δ)M(ℓ′,m′,p′,q′),(α,β,γ,δ)
=
∑
α,β,γ,δ
(−1)β·ℓ+α·qδγ,α+p+lδδ,β+q+m(−1)β·ℓ′+α·q′δγ,α+p′+l′δδ,β+q′+m′
=
∑
α,β,γ,δ
(−1)β·(ℓ+ℓ′)+α·(q+q′)δγ,α+p+lδδ,β+q+mδγ,α+p′+l′δδ,β+q′+m′
=
∑
α,β
(−1)β·(ℓ+ℓ′)+α·(q+q′)δp+l,p′+l′δq+m,q′+m′
= 22nδl,l′δq,q′δp+l,p′+l′δq+m,q′+m′
= 22nδl,l′δq,q′δp,p′δm,m′ .
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In showing the above we have also found the inverse of M. The orthonormality of M means that
MM
T = 22nI, and hence M−1 = MT /22n. Therefore, Ψ = M
T [1 0 ···0 ]T
22n , which means Ψ is the
first row of M renormalized:
Ψ(α,β),(γ,δ) =
M(0,0,0,0)(α,β,γ,δ)
22n
=
1
22n
δα,γδβ,δ .
Since
(
C˜†C˜
)
(α,β),(γ,δ)
= Ψ(α,β),(γ,δ) we have
C˜†C˜ =
1
22n
I22n×22n .
Since I22n×22n is a full rank matrix, then C˜ must have at least as many rows as columns. C˜ has
22n columns so M ≥ 22n.
Theorem 6.3 Any given quantum encryption set, {pk, Uk}, k = 1, · · · ,M , (i.e.,
∑
k
pk = 1, Uk is
unitary, and eqns. (2) and (5) are satisfied) has:
H(p1, · · · , pM ) =
M∑
i=1
pi log
1
pi
≥ 2n.
Hence, one must use at least 2n random classical bits for any quantum encryption. Additionally,
if M = 22n, then pk =
1
22n and Uk’s form an orthonormal basis. Hence, a set {pk, Uk} involving
only 2n secret classical bits is a quantum encryption set if and only if the unitary matrix elements
form an orthonormal basis, and they are all equally likely.
Proof: By Lemma 6.2 we have that
C˜†C˜ =
1
22n
I22n×22n .
Using a singular value decomposition[9] of C˜, we have the following relationships:
C˜ =WΛV †, C˜†C˜ = V (Λ†Λ)V †, and C˜C˜† =W (ΛΛ†)W † ,
where W and V are M ×M and 22n × 22n unitary matrices, respectively, and Λ is an M × 22n
diagonal rectangular matrix: Λ(i, j) = λiδi,j .Note that Λ
†Λ and ΛΛ† are real diagonal matrices
and have the same non-zero elements; hence, C˜†C˜ and C˜C˜† have the same non-zero eigenvalues.
Since C˜†C˜ has 22n repeated eigenvalues (= 122n ) and M ≥ 22n,C˜C˜† has 22n repeated eigenvalues
(= 122n ) and the rest of its M − 22n eigenvalues are 0. Also note that the diagonal entries of C˜C˜†
are the probabilities pk’s and hence,
pk =
Tr(U˜kU˜
†
k)
2n
= (C˜C˜†)k,k =
1
22n
22n∑
i=1
|Wi,k|2 ≤ 1
22n
.
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The above uses the facts that since W is unitary,
∑M
i=1 |Wi,k|2 = 1 and that M ≥ 22n. Hence,
H(p1, · · · , pM ) =
M∑
i=1
pi log
1
pi
≥ 2n
M∑
i=1
pi = 2n .
In the particular case where M = 22n, we have C˜C˜† = C˜†C˜ =
1
22n
I22n×22n . Hence
Tr(U˜kU˜
†
j )
2n
= δk,j
1
22n
,
which gives pk =
1
22n , and that the set {Uk} necessarily forms an orthonormal basis. The proof
is completed by observing that by lemma 6.1 any unitary orthonormal basis applied uniformly is
sufficient.
7 Encryption vs. Teleportation and Superdense Coding
One of the most interesting results in quantum information theory is the teleportation of quantum
bits by shared EPR pairs and classical channels[1]. The quantum one time pad described in
Section 4 could be implemented using the usual teleportation scheme by encrypting the classical
communications with a one time pad. Hence, teleportation gives one example of a quantum
encryption algorithm. In the original teleportation paper[1] a proof that two classical bits are
required to teleport is given. The proof is based on a construction that gives superluminal
communication if teleportation can be done with less than two bits. This proof however does not
imply that all quantum encryption sets require 2n bits. To do so would require one to prove that
all quantum encryption sets correspond to a teleportation protocol. On the other hand, as we
show next, all teleportation protocols correspond to a quantum encryption set; hence, Theorem 6.3
provides a new proof of optimality of teleportation.
A general teleportation scheme can be described as follows: Alice and Bob share a pure
state comprising 2n qubits, ρAB , such that the traced out n-bit states of Alice and Bob satisfy:
ρA = ρB =
1
2n I. Next, Alice receives an unknown n-bit quantum state ρ, and performs a joint
measurement (i.e., on ρ and ρA), which produces one of a fixed set of outcomes mk, k = 1, . . . ,M ,
each with probability pk. The particular outcome mk is classically communicated to Bob using
H(p1, . . . , pM ) bits. Bob performs a corresponding unitary operation Uk on his state to retrieve
ρ. Hence, after Alice’s measurement (and before Bob learns the outcome), Bob’s state can be
expressed as ρB =
1
2n I =
M∑
k=1
p(k)UkρU
†
k , which is exactly the encrypted state of the message, ρ,
defined in Eqn. (2). Hence, every teleportation scheme corresponds to an encryption protocol
{pk, Uk}. Since we prove that all quantum encryption sets require 2n classical bits, then all
teleportation schemes must also require 2n classical bits. Note that our proof only relies on the
properties of the underlying vector spaces.
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Superdense coding[10] also has a connection to quantum encryption. Consider the case where
Alice asks Bob to encrypt something and then Alice wishes to learn the key that Bob used to
encrypt. In the case of the classical one time pad [6] c = m⊕ k, and so given a message and it’s
accompanying ciphertext, one learns the key: k = m⊕ c. Quantumly, each quantum bit has two
classical key bits to learn. Due to Holevo’s theorem[11] it may seem that this implies that there is
no way to learn the classical key exactly. This intuition is not correct. Alice can learn Bob’s key
in the following way. Alice prepares n singlets and gives half of each singlet to Bob. Bob encrypts
them using the simple quantum one time pad and returns them to Alice. Alice can learn the key
exactly by measuring each former singlet in the bell basis. The outcome would tell Alice exactly
which transformation Bob applied. This protocol corresponds exactly to the superdense coding
scheme[10].
Interestingly, some insight is gained as to where the factor of two between the number of
classical and quantum bits comes from in both encryption and teleportation. In the case of
classical bits, ρ is diagonal. A basis for all diagonal matrices is Zβ. Hence, for encryption of
classical bits there are only 2n equations. In the quantum case, by lemma 5.1, there are 22n
equations to satisfy, so it is not too surprising that there are twice as many classical bits needed.
Equivalently, the log of the size of the space is twice as large quantumly as opposed to classically.
The proof given here could be particularized to give a new proof of Shannon’s original result on
informationally secure classical encryption[6].
8 Discussion
We have presented an algorithm for using 2n secret classical bits to secure n quantum bits. These
encrypted quantum bits may now be held by an untrusted party with no danger that information
may be learned from these bits. Any number of applications may be imagined for this algorithm,
or class of algorithms {pk, Uk}. For instance, rather than using random classical data of size 2n,
one could use a secret key ciphers[12] or stream ciphers[12] to keep a small finite classical key, for
instance 256 bits, to generate pseudo-random bits to encrypt quantum data. In fact, these notions
allow for straight-forward generalizations of many classical protocols to quantum data. Quantum
secret sharing has been developed[13] that may be used to share quantum secrets. Classical secret
sharing schemes are known that are informationally secure[14]. By encrypting a quantum state
of n bits with 2n classical bits, and then using classical secret sharing on the 2n bits, one may use
these informationally secure classical methods in the quantum world. This protocol would allow
users with only classical resources to perform secret sharing given an untrusted center to store
the quantum data. One application independently suggested by Cre´peau et. al.[15] is to build
quantum bit commitment schemes based on computationally secure classical bit commitment
schemes.
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